* caddyhttp: presize buffers in hot paths to reduce allocations
Right-size three per-request allocations that previously grew from a
nil/empty backing array, causing repeated reallocation:
- CleanPath: pre-Grow the strings.Builder used when slash collapsing is
disabled, instead of letting it reallocate as runes are appended
- headers: presize the rewritten value slice in HeaderOps.ApplyTo's Set
loop instead of appending from nil
- reverseproxy: presize the weights slice in WeightedRoundRobinSelection
.Select
This commit also adds benchmarks exercising each path. Measured with benchstat
with count=20 and GOMAXPROCS=1, with p=0.000:
sec/op B/op allocs/op
CleanPathNoCollapse 1013.4n -> 828.6n (-18.23%) 120->64 (-46.67%) 4->1 (-75.00%)
HeaderOpsApplyToSet 1262.0n -> 955.8n (-24.27%) 255->152 (-40.39%) 9->6 (-33.33%)
WeightedRoundRobinSelect 215.8n -> 200.3n ( -7.20%) 112->96 (-14.29%) 2->2 (N/A)
* caddyhttp: presize strings.Builder in query rewrite and path matcher
Two builders whose output size is bounded by a known input length were
growing from empty, causing repeated reallocation. Seed each with a
capacity hint:
- rewrite.buildQueryString: pre-Grow to len(qs) (runs per request when
rewrite query manipulation is configured)
- MatchPath.matchPatternWithEscapeSequence: pre-Grow to len(escapedPath)
(reached only when a path pattern contains % escape sequences)
Adds a benchmark for buildQueryString, measured with benchstat:
BuildQueryString:
- sec/op 965.2n -> 743.3n (-22.99%)
- B/op 248->80 (-67.74%)
- allocs/op 5->1 (-80.00%)
The builder previously reallocated four times per call. The matcher path
is cold and not separately benchmarked.
* chore: add benchmark headers
---------
Signed-off-by: Julien Voisin <jvoisin@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit c8492563ee)
* caddyhttp: lower-case path patterns with placeholders at request time
Patterns with placeholders were lower-cased at provisioning, which
changed case-sensitive placeholder names such as {env.FOO}, while the
replaced values were never lower-cased and so could not match the
lower-cased request path. Leave such patterns untouched at provisioning
and lower-case the expanded pattern at request time.
Fixes#6387
* caddyhttp: restore the encoded separator path matcher tests
(cherry picked from commit 2147da70f7)
HTTPBasicAuth.correctPassword built its hash cache key with
append(account.password, plaintextPassword...). account.password is
shared by all requests and can have spare capacity, so short passwords
were written into the stored hash's backing array, causing a data race
between concurrent requests and potentially mixed-up cache keys.
Build the key in a fresh buffer instead, and add regression tests.
(cherry picked from commit f89626aa55)
* requestbody: reject oversized Content-Length before the next handler
When max_size is set and the request declares a Content-Length above it, respond 413 right away instead of letting the next handler start and fail mid-read. Bodies of unknown length are still limited by MaxBytesReader. Both paths return the same error, so handle_errors sees no difference.
* caddytest: send unknown-length bodies in max_size placeholder tests
request_body now answers 413 for a declared Content-Length over max_size before the placeholder reads the body, so these tests no longer covered the read path and the direct respond one failed.
* requestbody: keep the body limited for error routes
Error routes get the same request, so wrap the body before the early 413 to stop them from reading past max_size.
(cherry picked from commit 6cdffe9502)
With fewer than two weights, WeightedRoundRobinSelection returned the
first upstream without checking that it is available.
(cherry picked from commit aeea18be86)
Use the chosen file info, not a zero size, to tell whether a candidate
was chosen, so smallest_size keeps an empty file and largest_size can
choose one.
(cherry picked from commit cce035d7ad)
When a handle_response status code did not evaluate to an integer, the
handler returned a 500 without closing the upstream response body,
leaking the connection.
(cherry picked from commit dccce45660)
* caddyhttp: add HTTP/1 body reuse regression tests
* ci: test and release with Go 1.27
---------
Co-authored-by: steadytao <mail@steadytao.com>
(cherry picked from commit 053be179d8)
* caddyhttp: let handler read deadlines cap the idle read timeout
IdleTimeoutReader sets the read deadline before every body read, so a
deadline set by a handler with http.ResponseController.SetReadDeadline()
was replaced before it could take effect. Since #7913, handlers can't
bound a stalled request body more tightly than read_body.
A handler's read deadline is now routed to the IdleTimeoutReader, which
applies it right away and keeps it as a ceiling for every idle reset and
for the deadline put back between HTTP/2 reads. A handler can make the
idle timeout stricter but can't loosen it, and a zero deadline removes
the ceiling, as #8145 does for write deadlines.
* caddyhttp: keep the hard read deadline and the drain deadline with handler deadlines
SetReadDeadline installed the handler's deadline as is, so a later or zero
deadline lifted read_timeout. It now installs the earlier of the two.
HandlerDone cleared a deadline set by the handler before arming the HTTP/1
drain deadline, leaving the post-handler drain unbounded.
* caddyhttp: keep the idle deadline of a read in flight on handler deadlines
SetReadDeadline replaced the idle deadline armed for a blocked read with the
handler's ceiling, so a zero or later deadline lifted the idle timeout for
that read. It now installs the earlier of the two until the read returns.
* caddyhttp: keep the expired drain deadline of a timed-out body on handler deadlines
After a body read timed out on HTTP/1, a zero or later deadline set by the
handler replaced the expired one kept to bound net/http's post-handler drain.
(cherry picked from commit a28f061462)
* perf: bypass header key normalization for canonical literals
http.Header's Get, Set, Add and Del run textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey
on every call. When the key is a canonical literal the result is the key
itself, so the scan is pure overhead. Access the map directly instead.
Only hot, allocation-free paths are converted, and only where the key is
a canonical literal. Call sites taking a key from config, a template or
the request itself still go through the normalizing methods, since they
need it for correctness.
allHeaderValues and lastHeaderValue dropped their http.CanonicalHeaderKey
call for the same reason: all callers pass canonical literals.
benchstat, Apple M5 Pro, go1.27.1:
PrepareRequest-15 659.4n ± 2% -> 457.7n ± 2% -30.58% (p=0.000 n=12)
AcceptedEncodings-15 330.8n ± 5% -> 309.4n ± 7% -6.44% (p=0.019 n=10)
ResponseWriterWriteHeader/event-stream-15 1007.5n ± 3% -> 732.5n ± 1% -27.30%
ResponseWriterWriteHeader/informational-15 60.0n ± 3% -> 48.0n ± 2% -20.01%
ResponseWriterWriteHeader/not-modified-15 214.3n ± 6% -> 175.3n ± 4% -18.20%
ResponseWriterWriteHeader/connect-15 60.2n ± 3% -> 51.9n ± 4% -13.85%
ResponseWriterWriteHeader/html-15 206.5n ± 4% -> 197.9n ± 2% -4.19%
geomean -14.38%
Allocations are unchanged.
* tests: verify http.Header map keys are canonical
Indexing http.Header directly skips the canonicalization Get/Set/Add/Del
perform, which also puts the key outside what CI checks. canonicalheader
only inspects method calls. staticcheck's SA1008 covers reads, but stops
descending as soon as an assignment writes to a header, so it misses the
write, the delete builtin and the read-modify-write append. A key that is
not canonical in those positions is a silent lookup miss, not a compile
error.
Walk the loaded packages and verify every string constant used as a key in
an http.Header map operation matches http.CanonicalHeaderKey. A helper that
takes the key from its caller would hide the literal again, so a parameter
named with a canonical prefix opts its arguments into the same check.
The WebSocket headers Caddy deliberately writes with RFC 6455 casing are
allowed explicitly; they are only ever written out, never looked up against
a parsed header map.
Covers 64 operations, runs in under a second, and promotes golang.org/x/tools
from an indirect to a direct dependency at the version already in the module
graph.
* headercheck: resolve aliases of http.Header
* headercheck: check http.Header composite literal keys
* headercheck: note overlap with canonicalheader
* headercheck: drop parameter-name check
Helpers now take the indexed values, so every key sits in an index expression the analyzer and the linter already check.
* headercheck: scope RFC 6455 exceptions to their call sites
A key-based allow-list also accepted reads such as h["Sec-WebSocket-Key"], which miss because parsed headers are canonical. Honor //nolint:canonicalheader on the line instead, which the linter will use too.
* encode: read every Accept-Encoding field line
AcceptedEncodings read only the first field line, so a client that split
the list across several lines had the rest ignored. RFC 9110 section 5.3
treats repeated list-field lines as one comma-joined list. Iterate over
the items of every line instead of joining them, and skip empty items,
which used to yield an empty encoding. file_server's precompressed
selection uses the same function and is fixed with it.
Fixes https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/8272
Co-authored-by: Kağan Küçük <kaankck@gmail.com>
* encode: read every Cache-Control and Content-Encoding field line
Only the first field line was read, but RFC 9110 section 5.3 makes
multiple lines of a list-based field equivalent to one comma-joined
value:
- Cache-Control: no-transform on a later line was ignored, so the
request or response was compressed anyway.
- Content-Encoding: an empty first line followed by a real coding let
the handler encode the body a second time.
* encode: parse Cache-Control no-transform per RFC 9111
The substring match missed No-Transform, though RFC 9111 section 5.2 compares directive names case-insensitively, and fired on text that is not the directive: longer tokens such as x-no-transform-ext, quoted arguments such as community="no-transform", and semicolon-separated values, which are not valid Cache-Control syntax. Split the field on commas outside quoted strings and match only a well-formed no-transform element.
* encode: keep accepted encoding preferences on the stack
AcceptedEncodings counted commas to size the preference slice, and the variable capacity put it on the heap. A constant capacity covers typical Accept-Encoding headers and lets the compiler keep the slice on the stack; append still moves it to the heap for longer ones. BenchmarkAcceptedEncodings: 151.8ns -> 120.5ns (-21%), 192 -> 64 B/op, 2 -> 1 allocs/op (n=8).
* encode: build the encoded ETag without fmt
fmt.Sprintf boxed both arguments and parsed the format on every encoded response with a strong ETag. Concatenation: 47ns -> 16.5ns, 56 -> 24 B, 3 -> 1 allocs.
* reverseproxy: access response Server and Via headers directly
finalizeResponse runs on every proxied response; skip the key normalization as prepareRequest already does on the request side.
* encode: access headers directly in Write, WriteHeader and Close
These run once per response; convert the remaining literal-key Get, Set and Add calls like the rest of the handler.
* encode: match Cache-Control no-transform with httpguts
httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken already compares list elements case-insensitively across field lines, so the hand-written list parser is unnecessary. A no-transform inside a comma-separated quoted argument now also disables encoding, which only errs toward not transforming.
* encode: inline the no-transform check
isEncodeAllowed only wrapped one httpguts call. Its unit test now drives the response directive through ServeHTTP instead.
---------
Co-authored-by: Kağan Küçük <kaankck@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 857d5731f3)
* fastcgi: keep the php_fastcgi directory redirect on the same origin
* fastcgi: build the directory redirect from the escaped original segment
(cherry picked from commit 32bba15459)
* caddytls: keep ACME issuer network proxy across re-provisioning
LoadModule clears NetworkProxyRaw, so when the HTTP app provisions an
ACME issuer a second time (fillInACMEIssuer), the rebuilt template has
no HTTPProxy. Since #7510 that template is used via SetConfig, and ACME
requests bypass the configured proxy.
Keep the loaded proxy func on the issuer, like the DNS solver.
Fixes#8283
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2366825f2380383dacd8adeb1508e34c3e25634d)
* caddytls: test that ACME requests use the proxy after RebuildCertMagic
Replace the provision-twice check with a regression for the path the
HTTP app takes: Provision, re-provision in fillInACMEIssuer, then
RebuildCertMagic. The test issues against a local proxy and asserts the
ACME request goes through it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: k4lleanka <257361691+k4lleanka@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit fead9c3f24)
* caddytls: validate curve and protocol names, compare protocol IDs
* caddytls: Add final newline to tests and drop duplicate protocol comment
(cherry picked from commit 71c5812cfe)
* fastcgi: Stop response bodies at the declared Content-Length
* fastcgi: Use a cancellable test context in proxy tests
(cherry picked from commit b058e3f3f6)
* reverseproxy: strip hop-by-hop headers when copying response headers
copy_response_headers copied the upstream header map before
finalizeResponse could strip hop-by-hop fields. Clone and strip
first, so include and exclude cannot forward them, and leave the
upstream response unchanged for later handlers in the route.
Co-authored-by: Grok 4.7 <noreply@x.ai>
(cherry picked from commit 258863f6f6)
* reverseproxy: close backend body and hijacked socket on upgrade setup failures
When an upstream response indicates an HTTP upgrade (101 Switching Protocols),
handleUpgradeResponse takes ownership of res.Body and subsequently hijacks
the client connection.
However, if any setup check fails prior to starting handleUpgradeTunnel
(such as mismatched upgrade headers, non-writable body assertion failure,
hijack unsupported, or handshake buffer flush errors), the function returned
early without closing res.Body or the hijacked client socket.
Because calling Hijack() permanently disables net/http's automatic connection
cleanup, and raw TCP sockets are not closed by the garbage collector, these
early failure exits leaked file descriptors into CLOSE_WAIT/ESTABLISHED.
Fix this by:
1. Adding a deferred cleanup guard that closes res.Body and any hijacked
front connection unless the tunnel successfully takes ownership.
2. Wrapping connections with onceCloseConn to ensure idempotent closure
while preserving optional CloseWrite (TCP half-close) support.
3. Adding TestUpgradeResponseCleanupOnFailure to verify cleanup.
* reverseproxy: test post-hijack cleanup and remove once-close wrappers
Cover handshake flush and buffered backend-write failures after successful hijacking, checking that both connections close. Keep setup-failure cleanup while using the original connections directly.
Code and tests were AI-assisted using an OpenAI coding assistant in Pi.
(cherry picked from commit 62bc606433)
* caddyhttp: add CEL expression support to the tls matcher
MatchTLS was the only core HTTP matcher without a CELLibrary() implementation,
so it could not be used inside an expression matcher. Every sibling matcher
(host, path, path_regexp, method, query, header, header_regexp, protocol,
remote_ip, client_ip, url_pattern, vars, vars_regexp, and the file-server's
file matcher) already has this.
Adds CELLibrary() to MatchTLS, exposing tls_handshake_complete('true') /
tls_handshake_complete('false') in CEL expressions. Mirrors MatchProtocol's
existing string-argument-macro pattern: CELMatcherImpl with cel.StringType,
parsing the argument with strconv.ParseBool and constructing a
MatchTLS{HandshakeComplete: &b} that reuses the matcher's own
MatchWithError. Adds the corresponding CELLibraryProducer interface guard.
Adds 6 cases to celmatcher_test.go's existing table-driven
TestMatchExpressionMatch/BenchmarkMatchExpressionMatch: match on
'true'/'false' against a complete/incomplete handshake, and three
invocation-error cases (no args, wrong arg type, non-boolean string).
Required adding a tlsHandshakeComplete *bool field to the shared test table
and wiring it into req.TLS.HandshakeComplete in both the test and benchmark
request-construction helpers.
Fixes#8087
* address review: use a native bool arg, rename to match the matcher's own name
francislavoie's review on #8088:
- "A boolean as a string argument is very strange." CELMatcherImpl only
supported string/list(string)/map argument types, so the original
implementation parsed a string literal with strconv.ParseBool to work
around that. Instead, extends CELMatcherImpl itself with a cel.BoolType
case (celMatcherBoolMacroExpander + isCELBoolExpr, mirroring the existing
string equivalents), so a matcher can accept a real CEL bool literal.
This is shared infrastructure, so any other matcher needing a bool
argument in the future gets it for free.
- "I'm not sure why tls_handshake_complete was chosen when the matcher is
named tls." Renamed the CEL function to tls(...), matching every other
matcher's naming convention (the function name mirrors the matcher's own
directive/module name: host(), path(), method(), protocol(), etc.).
Usage is now 'expression tls(true)' / 'expression tls(false)' instead of
'expression tls_handshake_complete(\'true\')'.
Updated the 6 existing test cases accordingly; still covers match/no-match
on both true/false and the two invocation-error cases (no args, wrong arg
type -- now a string instead of a bool, confirming the new type check).
* address review: cover tls() against a plain non-TLS request
steadytao asked for a test proving tls(false) doesn't treat the absence
of TLS as an incomplete handshake. MatchWithError already handles this
correctly (r.TLS == nil returns false regardless of HandshakeComplete),
this just adds the missing coverage for both tls(true) and tls(false)
against a plain http:// request.
Confirmed these tests catch a real regression: removing the r.TLS == nil
guard causes a nil pointer dereference panic, not just a wrong result.
* address review: redesign tls() CEL matcher to preserve all three Caddyfile states
The Caddyfile tls matcher has three states: bare `tls` (any TLS connection,
regardless of handshake completion), `tls early_data` (handshake not yet
complete), and the implicit "handshake complete" case. The previous
tls(true)/tls(false) design could only express the latter two, with no way
to express "any TLS, don't care about handshake state" from CEL.
Redesigns the macro to:
tls() -- any TLS connection (mirrors bare `tls`)
tls('complete') -- handshake complete
tls('early_data') -- handshake not yet complete (mirrors `tls early_data`)
tls() is implemented as sugar for tls('any'): a zero-arg macro that expands
to the same 2-arg call the one-arg string macro produces, just with the
literal injected by the macro itself. Both macros share one function
registration and one matcher factory, so there's a single source of truth
for the string-to-MatchTLS mapping.
This replaces the native-bool design from the prior commit, so also removes
the generic bool-argument support (celMatcherBoolMacroExpander,
isCELBoolExpr, and the CELMatcherImpl case for cel.BoolType) added for it,
since nothing else in the codebase used it and it would otherwise ship as
unreviewed, unused surface area.
Rewrites the existing tls(...) test cases for the new string-based calls,
and adds coverage for the new tls() form: matches regardless of handshake
state (both complete and incomplete), and still correctly fails to match a
plain non-TLS request. Also covers the new invocation-error cases: a
boolean argument is no longer valid, and an unrecognized string (anything
other than 'complete'/'early_data') is now a Provision-time error instead
of silently doing the wrong thing.
Verified: full caddyhttp test suite passes, and confirmed each new/changed
test fails when its corresponding implementation piece is reverted
(the zero-arg macro, and the complete/early_data boolean mapping).
* address review: document and test tls('any') as a supported literal form
steadytao pointed out that the zero-arg tls() macro expands internally to
the same tls_request_string(req, "any") call that the one-arg form uses,
which means tls('any') was already silently reachable as a literal string
even though it was never documented or tested as part of the public API.
Rather than special-casing the macro to bypass the shared string factory
(which would need a second function/overload just for the zero-arg case),
document and test tls('any') as a real, supported third spelling alongside
tls() -- they're already fully equivalent, so there's nothing to hide.
(cherry picked from commit b1694e7a4c)
When a forward proxy is configured (network_proxy, forward_proxy_url or
HTTP_PROXY), net/http wraps dial errors in a *net.OpError with Op
"proxyconnect". tryAgain used a type assertion to detect DialError, so it
missed the wrapped error and treated it as a failure after the request
was sent. Non-GET requests were then not retried, even though no
connection to the proxy was ever established.
Use errors.As so a DialError is recognized anywhere in the error chain.
Errors that do not contain a DialError are unaffected, so requests that
may have reached the proxy or upstream are still not retried by default.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f355b8687d)
* headers: Check each ? default on its own and keep the response matcher
Several ? defaults in one header block shared one require, so a single
field already set on the response blocked all of them. A match in the
block was also dropped for the ? fields, so they were set on every
response.
* headers: Reject a response matcher on a field that also has a ? default
A ? default already requires its field to be absent, so a match on the
same field in that block could only be dropped or never be true. It is
now a Caddyfile error.
* headers: Test that the last ? default for a field wins
* headers: Allow an absence matcher on a field with a ? default
`match header !X-Test` asks for what `?X-Test` already requires, so it
loads again. Only a matcher that needs a value on that field is an error.
(cherry picked from commit 0584875297)
A password piped with a Windows line ending was hashed with the trailing
\r, so basic_auth rejected the real password, and input without a final
newline failed with EOF.
(cherry picked from commit be5fba4ff2)
* fastcgi: derive SCRIPT_FILENAME from the normalized request path
Path matchers evaluate a normalized request path — MatchPath applies
normalizeWindowsPath and then CleanPath before comparing — but the FastCGI
transport split r.URL.Path verbatim. Caddy does not rewrite r.URL.Path itself,
so the two disagreed whenever the path contained dot segments after the split
token: /admin.php/../../other.php was matched as /other.php while
SCRIPT_FILENAME resolved to <root>/admin.php, and on Windows the same held for
/admin.php\..\other.php. A route gated by a path matcher could therefore execute
a script that matcher never evaluated.
php_fastcgi generates a rewrite route that normally normalizes the path first,
but that route can fail to match, so the transport establishes the invariant
itself rather than inheriting it. The reason it can fail to match is addressed
in the following commit; this change does not depend on it.
caddyhttp.NormalizedPath is added so a consumer acting on a path a matcher has
already judged derives it exactly as the matcher did, rather than reassembling
the two steps and risking drift.
Scope — two divergences of the same class are NOT addressed here:
* SCRIPT_NAME remains a prefix of the request path, so a matcher naming a
script exactly (path /admin.php) is still reachable via PATH_INFO at
/admin.php/anything. Matchers protecting a script need a trailing wildcard
regardless; that is inherent to CGI, not to this bug.
* On Windows, NTFS 8.3 short names are not rejected here. fileserver's
ServeHTTP rejects them (and ':' for ADS) precisely because matchers cannot
see through them, so GET /ADMIN~1.PHP is judged as /admin~1.php by a
path matcher while NTFS resolves SCRIPT_FILENAME to admin.php. Closing that
means sharing fileserver's hasWindowsShortName across packages, which is a
larger change than this fix; it is reported alongside this one and a patch
is available on request.
Side effects: PATH_INFO and DOCUMENT_URI are now derived from the normalized
path, so repeated slashes are merged and "." segments removed (/index.php//a//b
yields PATH_INFO=/a/b rather than //a//b), and on Windows per-component trailing
dots and spaces are folded. An application routing on a raw PATH_INFO will see
this. An empty URL.Path stays empty rather than becoming ".". REQUEST_URI is
unchanged and still carries the original target.
Tests: a buildEnv regression over literal and percent-encoded dot segments,
covering that legitimate PATH_INFO is preserved and an empty path stays empty; a
Windows-only counterpart whose cases each fail without the Windows
normalization; and an end-to-end test of a basic_auth-protected php_fastcgi
route against a FastCGI responder reporting the SCRIPT_FILENAME it received. The
end-to-end test uses `index off` so no rewrite route exists, ensuring it
exercises the transport rather than the rewrite.
* fileserver: make first_exist_fallback fall back when the file is absent
The try_policy first_exist_fallback is documented to match unconditionally,
falling back to the last try_files entry when no earlier candidate exists. It
did not: candidates are built with fs.Glob, which returns only paths that exist,
so an absent final entry left the list empty and the fallback branch — nested
inside the loop over that list — was unreachable.
php_fastcgi hard-codes this policy so its generated rewrite route always runs;
when the fallback failed, that rewrite was silently skipped.
Keep the pattern itself as a candidate when nothing globbed. This also aligns
Linux with Windows, where globResults is populated without an existence check
and the fallback already fired.
Behaviour change worth calling out: on a php_fastcgi site whose root has no
index.php (or no file matching the configured index), the rewrite now always
runs, so a request for a path that exists neither on the filesystem nor as a PHP
script is proxied to the backend as <root>/index.php instead of falling through
to file_server and returning 404. That is what the documented fallback promises,
but for a site of standalone .php scripts plus static assets it is a visible
change: unmatched requests now reach PHP-FPM.
The other try policies still test existence explicitly, so a candidate that does
not exist is skipped — but note this applies to ANY pattern that expands to
nothing, not only a malformed glob: a file whose literal name contains glob
metacharacters can now match under first_exist, largest_size and smallest_size
where previously globbing found it only via expansion.
* fileserver: synthesize the literal candidate only for the fallback entry
Address review: the previous commit appended the pattern itself as a
candidate inside makeCandidates whenever globbing found nothing. Since
makeCandidates is shared by every try_policy, first_exist, largest_size,
smallest_size and most_recently_modified could then stat the literal
pattern, so a file whose name contains glob metacharacters (for example
"lit[1].txt") matched where it did not before.
Restore makeCandidates to its original behaviour and build the literal
candidate only for the final entry of first_exist_fallback, the one
entry that is documented to match unconditionally. Placeholders in that
entry are expanded without glob escaping, since nothing is globbed, so
a request for /a[b].txt falls back to /a[b].txt rather than /a\[b].txt.
The path is still cleaned and joined with SanitizedPathJoin, so it
cannot escape the root.
This supersedes the last paragraph of the previous commit message: the
other policies now behave exactly as they did before that commit. The
php_fastcgi behaviour change described there still applies.
Add a regression test that creates a file literally named "lit[1].txt"
and checks that only the fallback entry of first_exist_fallback matches
it by its literal name, including the split_path remainder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fastcgi: add license headers to new test files
Address review: phpfastcgi_test.go and fastcgi_windows_test.go were
added without the Apache license header used across the codebase. On
the Windows test, the header goes above the build constraint, matching
replacer_fuzz.go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fastcgi: avoid hardcoded Unix paths in dot-segment tests
Address review: the new tests compared SCRIPT_FILENAME against strings
with forward slashes ("/srv/other.php", a "/admin.php" suffix), but the
transport makes the root absolute and joins it with filepath.Join, so
on Windows the value is C:\srv\other.php and the assertions would fail.
Use a temporary directory as the root and build the expected paths with
filepath instead.
Also lower the bcrypt cost of the integration test's basic_auth hash to
the minimum. At cost 14 the authenticated request exceeded the 5s test
client timeout under -race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4ec5a5c39a)
A CGI script that redirects by printing only a Location header got a
200 response with that header, which clients do not follow. RFC 3875
section 6.2.3 says the server sends 302 Found for this response, and
net/http/cgi, nginx and Apache do so.
(cherry picked from commit 1962b20401)
With request_buffers or response_buffers set to unlimited, the error
from reading the body was discarded and whatever had been read was
treated as the complete body. A request cut short by request_body
max_size was forwarded truncated with a 200, and a truncated chunked
upstream response was sent to the client as complete.
Handle a read error the same way the limited case already does.
(cherry picked from commit fc3d83400b)
* templates: avoid zero content length for bodyless responses
Drop Content-Length for HEAD and statuses that cannot carry a body instead of using the empty template buffer length. Continue setting the rendered length for ordinary responses.
AI-assisted-by: Jcode (OpenAI)
* templates: test Content-Length for HEAD, 204 and 304 responses
* templates: omit Content-Length for 2xx responses to CONNECT
RFC 9110 section 8.6 forbids Content-Length in any 2xx response to
CONNECT. Non-2xx CONNECT responses still report the rendered length.
(cherry picked from commit 401582cccf)
Kévin Dunglas
Julien Voisin
Steffen Busch
D'Ali Ben Macha
Venkatesh Panda
Zen Dodd
Nguyen Thanh Dat
Krish Singh Hura
Kartik K
Francis Lavoie
sam-kota
K4lleAnka
Akinyemi Toluwalase
Sulaiman Dauda
tomholford
Rob Martin
Aradhya Jain
Adarsh Kumar
Mohamed A. Abdel Fattah
Jay Hemnani
awss
小莳
pamnario
Shane
a